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Abstract 
This study investigates bank income smoothing, focusing on the effect of corruption on the extent of 
income smoothing by African banks. I find that banks use loan loss provisions to smooth positive (non-
negative) earnings particularly in the post-2008 crisis period and this behaviour is reduced by strong 
investor protection. Also, I find that banks in highly corrupt environments smooth their positive (non-
negative) earnings as opposed to smoothing the entire profit distribution. Finally, cross-country 
variation in bank income smoothing is observed. The findings have implications.  
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1. Introduction 
The question I address is whether African banks use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings and 
whether this behaviour is influenced by the level of corruption and other institutional factors. Corruption 
is a major socio-political factor that affect productivity in any economy. Corruption is an important 
socio-political problem that cannot be ignored, and income smoothing is also an important financial 
reporting property that auditors, bank managers, and regulators care about. So far, the impact of 
corruption on bank performance has received little attention in the banking literature, and the impact of 
corruption on bank income smoothing particularly in Africa is yet to be known. 
Income smoothing by banks is important to bank regulators, central banks, auditors and standard setters 
because it can have positive effects for financial system stability and can also have negative effects for 
transparency in financial reporting (Acharya and Ryan, 2016; Ozili and Outa, 2017; Ozili and Thankom, 
2018). One tool that banks can use to smooth income is loan loss provisions. The bank income 
smoothing literature identify loan loss provisions as an important tool used by banks to smooth income 
due to its direct impact on bank net interest margin and its role in mitigating credit risk arising from 
bank lending1; therefore, I focus on loan loss provisions as the income smoothing tool in this study, 
although loan loss provision is not the only financial number that bank managers can use to smooth 
income to achieve some desired financial reporting outcome.2 
Previous African studies have focused on, for example, the determinants of loan loss provisions and 
how loan loss provisions affect bank lending (see, Ozili, 2018); the implications of bank earnings 
management for the funding and diversification strategy of banks (see, Amidu and Kuipo, 2015); and 
the effect of audit quality on bank income smoothing (see, Ozili, 2017a). These studies did not consider 
the role of socio-political factors, particularly corruption, for the persistence of income smoothing in 
African banks.  
In contrast to previous studies, I focus on the role of corruption for the persistence of income smoothing 
by African banks because corruption is a major socio-political issue affecting businesses in Africa 
particularly banks. For instance, bank executives (or managers) in Africa often have political ties to top 
government officials and business elites, and tend to lend favourably to their ‘friends in politics and 
business’ in order to gain favour from the ruling elites. Similarly, bank executives (or managers) can 
grant special loans to controlling shareholders in the bank who in return will extend the bank 
executive/manager’s tenure in the bank. The loans and advances given to these individuals, or given to 
their businesses, usually do not undergo the rigorous loan screening processes and collateral assessment 
requirement in banks. Subsequently, these loans would become non-performing, and is written-off as a 
loss against bank profit. To hide such losses from regulators and minority shareholders, bank managers 
have incentives to smooth income to hide their corrupt lending practices. Generally, in the African 
banking environment, loans tend to be issued to borrowers not only based on credit risk considerations, 
but also based on favourism and other institutional and socio-political considerations. 
Institutional quality is also important and can help to limit manager’s discretion in opportunistic 
financial reporting (Leuz et al, 2003). Yet, the quality of institutions in Africa is low compared to the 
quality of institutions in Europe due to differences in the level of development, enforcement levels, etc. 
Also, the growing need for African countries to establish institutions that promote higher voice and 
accountability levels, stronger corruption control, greater protection of the rights of minority 
shareholder and greater director liability, makes this study relevant; therefore, it is important to 
understand how the presence of these institutions influence bank income smoothing behaviour 
particularly in Africa.  
                                                          
1 Cavallo and Majnoni (2002), Kanagaretnam et al. (2004), Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), Liu and Ryan 
(2006), Anandarajan et al. (2007), Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008), Ozili (2017a), Ozili and Outa (2017) and Ozili and Thankom (2018). 
2 Other income smoothing tool include available for sale securities (Barth et al, 2017).  
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I employ bank data from 19 African countries during the 2004 to 2013 period. The results reveal that 
there is cross-country variation in the use of loan loss provisions for income smoothing purposes. 
African banks in corrupt environments tend to smooth their positive earnings more aggressively but this 
behaviour is mitigated by strong investor protection. The findings have implications for the micro-
prudential supervision of banks. Firstly, regulators should not rely solely on loan loss provisions and 
reported earnings when assessing the risk exposure of African banks due to banks’ ability to hide risks 
by smoothing their income, rather bank regulators should consider a number of other factors including 
the institutional factors and relevant socio-political factors in the banking environment. Secondly, 
strong institutions can help to reduce the opacity of bank’s financial reporting. Policy makers should 
develop policies to strengthen existing institutions and ensure that they have the appropriate 
enforcement powers to function effectively. Finally, the findings could prove to be valuable to investors 
since they must take into consideration the quality of country legal framework and institutions before 
making investment decisions. Investors should demand supplementary information and legal protection 
in order to reach a better investment decision and outcomes. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, this study contributes to the bank 
income smoothing literature (for example, Kilic et al, 2012; Bouvatier et al, 2014; Ozili and Outa, 2017; 
and Ozili and Thankom, 2018). These studies suggest that banks have incentives to reduce high earnings 
and to increase low earnings so that reported earnings is never too high or too low. Focussing on African 
banks, the study contributes to this literature by showing that banks may prefer to smooth only positive 
(non-negative) earnings rather than the entire earnings distribution. Secondly, this study contributes to 
the literature that associate income smoothing with the opacity of reported earnings (see, Bhattacharya 
et al, 2003; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar, 2006). A major argument in this 
literature is that smoothed earnings yield reported earnings that do not reflect the true underlying 
economic reality of firms, therefore, income smoothing produces non-transparent earnings which is a 
form of corruption, at least from an ethical accounting viewpoint. I add to this literature by showing 
that the association between bank income smoothing (or opaque earnings) and corruption is only 
significant for positive earnings, particularly, in Africa. Finally, this study contributes to the broad 
earnings management literature. Income smoothing is considered to be a type of earnings management 
(e.g Ozili, 2017a; Leuz et al., 2003; Shen and Chih, 2005), and I observe that earnings management, or 
income smoothing, is also prevalent among banks in Africa, which is consistent with previous studies 
that find similar evidence for banks in Europe and Asia (Packer and Zhu, 2012; Curcio and Hasan, 
2015; Ozili and Thankom, 2018). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 present the literature review and develops the 
hypothesis. Section 3 presents the sample selection criteria and methodology. Section 4 report and 
discuss the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. The term ‘income smoothing’ and ‘earnings 
smoothing’ are used interchangeably throughout this paper.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Literature 
Income smoothing is the process of minimizing the fluctuation of reported earnings over time (Wall 
and Koch, 2000; Ozili and Outa, 2017). The income smoothing hypothesis argue that banks can 
decrease high earnings in good years and increase low earnings in bad years to generate stable, or 
smoother, earnings over time (Ozili and Outa, 2017; Skala, 2015). Income or earnings smoothing may 
be achieved using one or more accounting numbers to minimize the variation of reported earnings over 
time. 
An extensive literature document evidence for income smoothing using loan loss provisions, and these 
studies conclude that bank managers can use their discretion in provisioning to smooth reported 
earnings to achieve some desired earnings outcome (e.g. Kanagaretnam et al, 2004; Fonseca and 
Gonzalez, 2008; Leventis et al, 2011; El Sood, 2012; Ozili and Thankom, 2018). For instance, multi-
country studies document evidence that banks use provisions to smooth income after controlling for 
country-level differences. For example, Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) examine income smoothing 
practices in a cross-country context and find that bank income smoothing behaviour decreases in 
countries with strong investor protection, strict accounting disclosure, restrictions on bank activities, 
official and private supervision. In addition, they find that income smoothing increases with market-
orientation and level of development of the financial system. Similarly, Shen and Chih (2005) show 
that strong investor protection and stringent accounting disclosure can reduce bank earning 
management. Kanagaretnam et al (2014) examine the effect of legal, extra-legal and political 
institutional factors on earnings quality of banks across countries during the 1993 to 2006 period. They 
find that earnings quality is higher in countries with stronger legal, extra-legal and political institutional 
structures. they also find that banks in countries with stronger institutions are less likely to report losses, 
have lower loan loss provisions, and higher balance sheet strength during the 2007–2009 crisis period. 
European studies, for example, Leventis et al (2011) examine the provisioning practices of 91 listed 
European banks and find that European banks engage in income smoothing but this behaviour was 
significantly reduced after mandatory IFRS adoption. Olszak et al (2017) find that strong investor 
protection and more restrictive bank capital regulations reduce the procyclicality of LLP in banks while 
Ozili and Thankom (2018) find that income smoothing is more evident among systemic banks than in 
non-systemic European banks. Bouvatier et al (2014) examine European banks and find that income 
smoothing is pronounced among European banks with concentrated ownership while income smoothing 
is reduced in European countries with strict regulations. Curcio and Hasan (2015) examine Euro area 
and non-Euro area banks, and find that higher investor protection significantly reduces the incentives 
to smooth earnings for Euro Area banks; also, during the recent financial crisis, Euro Area bank 
managers were much more concerned with their credit portfolio quality and did not use loan loss 
provisions for income smoothing or for other discretionary purposes.  
In the Asian region, Wu et al. (2015) find that Chinese banks with foreign investor ownership engaged 
in income smoothing to a greater extent compared to banks without foreign investor ownership. Curcio 
et al (2014) find that Chinese banks smooth income during the financial crisis. However, Bryce et al. 
(2015) find that Vietnamese banks did not engage in income smoothing. The results are mixed among 
Asian studies, and these studies did not consider the role of socio-political factors in influencing bank 
income smoothing. Packer and Zhu (2012) also find evidence for income smoothing in a regional 
analysis of Asian banks. Similar studies include Ozili (2018) and Bonin and Kosak (2013). Vishnani et 
al (2019) investigate income smoothing using provisions in India and find that Indian banks smooth 
their profits over time. 
P.K. Ozili 
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In Africa, Ahmed et al (2014) examine Nigerian banks and find evidence for earnings management 
using provisions for Nigerian banks, using the magnitude of the residual as indicative of income 
smoothing in their modelling. Ozili (2015) used similar methodology in the literature and find evidence 
for income smoothing among listed banks in Nigeria. This study extends this growing literature by 
examining a wider sample of African countries while controlling for institutional quality and socio-
political factors. 
Jointly, the studies on LLPs draw inference from the statistical relationship between loan loss provisions 
and earnings before tax and provisions. A positive and significant coefficient for the earnings before 
tax and provisions variable is indicative of income smoothing, however, it is unknown whether similar 
or conflicting evidence may be found among African banks. Few African studies have examined income 
smoothing practices in a single country context (e.g. Ahmed et al, 2014; Ozili, 2015).  
 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Investor Protection 
Investor protection is defined as the power to expropriate minority shareholders and creditors within 
the constraints imposed by law (La Porta et al., 2002). The argument for investor protection as an 
important institutional factor is that the presence of institutions or rules that protect investor’s rights can 
reduce the ability of firm insiders to acquire private control benefits and mitigates the incentive to 
manipulate accounting earnings because there is little or nothing to conceal from outsiders (Leuz et al, 
2003). Therefore, managers in countries with strong investor protection are likely to provide more 
transparent financial reports to avoid the risk of litigation arising from concealing important information 
to outsiders; hence, strong investor protection should act as an effective deterrent against earnings 
management for firms in countries with strong investor protection compared to firms with low investor 
protection (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008). Given that income (or earnings) smoothing is a form 
of earnings management, it can be argued that strong investor protection should also limit the extent of 
bank income smoothing. Therefore, I predict a negative association between investor protection and 
income smoothing for African banks. 
H1: Income smoothing is negatively associated with investor protection 
2.2.2. Corruption 
The consequence of corruption for accounting quality and bank behaviour is often ignored in the income 
smoothing literature. Bhattacharya et al (2003) stress that one obvious manifestation of low accounting 
quality is the high level of earnings opacity. They argue that the quality of accounting in a given country 
can be measured by three dimensions of earnings opacity – loss avoidance, income smoothing and 
earnings aggressiveness. In summary, they suggest that earnings are opaque either because a) managers 
have an incentive to manipulate earnings, b) accounting standards are too loose and, c) the enforcement 
of standards is very lax; and that banks in corrupt countries can exhibit high degree of non-transparency 
in financial reporting due to low accountability.  
The presence of corruption in a country communicates weak accountability systems that bank managers, 
politicians and government officials can take advantage of, to divert corporate (or public) resources for 
private benefits. Bank managers may have some incentives to make bank earnings appear stable over 
time while perpetuating fraud at the same time to disguise the fraud act. Also, the incentive to smooth 
income to hide fraudulent accounting practices is likely to be higher in countries where corrupt 
politicians and government officials directly influence the decisions of African bank managers. 
Therefore, I predict that bank income smoothing is positively associated with perceived corruption 
levels (measured as the inverse of perceived corruption index). 
P.K. Ozili 
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H2: Income smoothing is positively associated with perceived corruption levels 
 
On the other hand, if bank executives are concerned that the ‘voice and accountability (VA)’ 
environment will encourage protests and whistle-blowing against corporate malpractice and corruption, 
and if bank executives believe that the VA environment will reward individuals or groups that blow-
the-whistle against corruption, bank executives will be more cautious in their earnings management or 
smoothing practices for fear of being exposed by the media. Corruption studies (such as: Chowdhury, 
2004; Goel and Nelson, 2005; Asongu, 2013) argue that laws or institutions that strengthen voice and 
accountability levels in a country can ensure greater economic and political freedom which further 
improves the fight against corruption. Therefore, I predict that bank income smoothing will be lower in 
less corrupt environments. 
H3: Income smoothing is negatively associated with high institutional quality which mitigates 
corruption. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data and Sample Selection Criteria 
The data employed is a pooled cross-section and time series data of individual banks’ balance sheet 
items from 19 economies in Africa: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroun, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo Tunisia, Uganda 
and Zambia. The sample period examined is from 2004 to 2013. Annual bank data is obtained from 
four sources: bank-level balance sheet and income statement data is obtained from Van Dijk Bankscope 
database, and all financial statement data have December 31st year-end. Macroeconomic data on gross 
domestic product in each jurisdiction were collected from the World Economic Forum archived in 
World Bank Databank database. Investor protection data is obtained from World Bank’s Doing 
Business Project Database while socio-political data is obtained from Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) and Transparency International.  
The availability of bank-specific data allows for the investigation of individual banks’ provisioning 
characteristic.3 No distinction is made between commercial banks and other banks so that a very large 
sample can be obtained. To clean up the data, similar to the practice of Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) and 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003), I eliminate extreme outliners in the dataset (e.g. loan growth above 99% 
and tier 1 Capital above 50%). Secondly, banks that did not have annual data for loan loss provisions 
were excluded from the sample. Thirdly, banks with observations for crucial variables that are available 
for fewer than three consecutive years were excluded to control for the quality of bank financial 
reporting. Fourth, I did not eliminate 2008 bank-year observations to control for the impact of the 2008 
financial crisis.4 The resulting final sample yields 302 African bank samples that provide useful data on 
loan loss provisions and other crucial variables for 10 years. Table 1 summarises the distribution of 
sample banks. 
                                                          
3 . In the data file, there are high number of available observations on bank loan loss provisions while there are fewer number of observation 
for the bank Tier 1 capital. This is obviously because many countries in Africa have not adopted Basel capital regulations. 
4 At the time of the 2008 financial crisis, African banks were not systemically integrated with the global financial system, hence, there is no 
reason to believe that balance sheet of African banks were adversely affected by the 2008 crisis. An attempt to eliminate the 2008 bank-year 
observations for all banks to control for the crisis effect will introduce bias into the analysis by systematically eliminating observations for 
other banks that were not affected by the financial crisis. Because the authors do not have the resources to accurately identify which banks 
were affected and unaffected by the 2008 financial crisis, the 2008 bank-year observations were retained in the analysis.  More so, I 
acknowledge that the 2008 crisis had some after-shock effect on some, not all, banks in Africa and that the after-shock effect on banks and 
the economy extended into year 2009 and 2010. Although this impact is worth noting, the author maintain that it is unreasonable to eliminate 
2009 and 2010 bank-year observations to adjust for economic after-shocks. 
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Table 1: Summary of Sample Distribution 
Table 1 reports the sample distribution of banks based on country and region. There are 2 
Central African countries, 4 North African countries, 4 West African countries, 4 East 
African countries and 5 Southern African countries. 
Country Central 
Africa 
North 
Africa 
West 
Africa 
East 
Africa 
Southern 
Africa 
# Banks 
Algeria  16    16 
Angola 14     14 
Botswana     12 12 
Cameroun 11     11 
Egypt  16    16 
Ethiopia    12  12 
Ghana   15   15 
Kenya    24  24 
Mauritius     15 15 
Morocco  18    18 
Namibia     10 10 
Nigeria   16   16 
Senegal   10   10 
South Africa     29 29 
Tanzania    16  16 
Togo   7   7 
Tunisia    26    26 
Uganda    21  21 
Zambia     14 14 
       
Grand Total 25 76 48 73 80 302 
 
3.2. Methodology 
The Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic models of panel data 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) is used to estimate the relationship between provisions and pre-provision 
earnings after controlling for non-discretionary provisions, other discretionary use of provisions, macro-
economic, institutional and social-political influences. GMM methodology can address three relevant 
econometric issues. First, it addresses the presence of unobserved bank-specific effects, which is 
eliminated by taking first-differences of all variables; (ii) the autoregressive process in the data 
regarding the behaviour of provisions (i.e., the need to use a lagged dependent variables model to 
capture the dynamic nature of provisions; and (iii) the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
The panel GMM estimator controls for potential endogeneity by using instruments based on lagged 
values of the explanatory variables. Among recent empirical studies, only Laeven and Majnoni (2003) 
and Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) use this estimator.5 
The model is consistent with Kanagaretnam et al (2004), Liu and Ryan (2006), Kilic et al (2012), Curcio 
and Hasan (2015), Ozili (2017a) and Ozili and Thankom (2018). The baseline equation is: 
                                                          
5 To further verify that GMM is more appropriate, I first estimate the OLS least squares equation without lagged variables. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic report that there is positive serial correlation. When I introduced the lagged variable, the serial correlation disappears and DW approach 
2.0. However, I am aware that DW statistic can be misleading for models that follow a dynamic process. Rather than use Newey-West’s robust 
standard errors, to be safe, I use GMM to control for the dynamic nature of provisions. Hence, the GMM is more appropriate. 
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𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 +  𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 
+  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖, 𝑡. 
The income smoothing variable is the EBTP variable. After introducing institutional variables into the 
model, the expanded model is given as: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 +  𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 
+  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑗 +  𝐸𝐷𝐿 +  𝐸𝐷𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 +  𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑂 +  𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑂 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 
+  𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇 +  𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 +  𝐶𝑂𝐶 +  𝐶𝑂𝐶 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 +  𝑉𝐴 +  𝑉𝐴
∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 +  𝜀𝑖, 𝑡. 
EBTP coefficient is the income smoothing variable. A significant and positive sign for the EBTP 
coefficient indicates the presence of income smoothing. For robustness purposes, I also focus on the 
size of earnings by dividing the earnings distribution into two: positive earnings and negative earnings 
(i.e. losses). The POS variable takes the value of ‘1’ if reported earnings is positive and substantial, and 
‘0’ when reported earnings is negative.  
Regarding the control variables, non-performing loans to gross loan ratio (NPL) and loan growth 
(LOAN) capture the riskiness of banks’ loan portfolio. A positive sign on the NPL coefficient is 
expected because banks will increase loan loss provision when they expect loan defaults and/or high 
problem loans (Ozili, 2019; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). Loan growth (LOAN) is a proxy for 
contemporaneous credit risk (Lobo and Yang, 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). A positive sign for 
LOAN coefficient indicates that provisions increase as loan supply increases due to credit risk concerns. 
However, Lobo and Yang (2001) points out that a negative coefficient may indicate improved quality 
of incremental loans, therefore, I do not have a definite prediction for this variable. The CAR variable 
captures the use of provisions to manage regulatory capital (e.g. Kilic et al, 2012; Bonin and Kosak, 
2013), and I expect a negative sign for CAR coefficient which is consistent with the capital management 
hypothesis.  
The SIZE variable capture the size of a bank, measured as the logarithm of total assets. Large banks are 
considered to have higher levels of business activities and such large banks may set aside higher 
provisions to commensurate for their high business levels compared to smaller banks (Anandarajan et 
al, 2003; Ozili, 2017a), therefore, a positive sign for the SIZE coefficient is expected. The use of natural 
logarithm of total asset (SIZE) to measure bank size is consistent with Kilic et al (2012), Ozili (2015), 
Curcio and Hasan (2015) and Ozili and Thankom (2018).  
At country level, real gross domestic product growth (ΔGDP) captures bank provisioning that depend 
on the state of the economic cycle. The literature document that bank provisioning increases 
significantly during economic downturns and decreases during good years (Leaven and Majnoni, 2003; 
Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Agénor and Zilberman, 2015; Soedarmono et al, 2017). Therefore, a 
negative sign for the ΔGDP coefficient is expected.  
The institutional factors are the investor protection variables. The three investor protection variables are 
the index of strength of investor protection (INVTPRO), extent of director liability (EDL), and rule of 
law (LEGAL). INVTPRO measure the extent that the legal system in a country protect the rights of 
minority shareholders against managers. This variable ranges from 0 to 10. EDL measure the extent 
that the legal system in a country favour the right of minority shareholders to sue directors and the 
likelihood that the minority shareholder will win the case. This variable ranges from 0 to 10. The EDL 
and INVTPRO variables are developed based on the methodology of Djankov, La Porta and others (see. 
Djankov et al, 2008).6 LEGAL is the ‘rule of law’ index developed by Kaufman et al (2001) which 
                                                          
6 These two indices for investor protection derive explicitly from the nature, terms, conditions and enforcement of business transactions among 
counterparties in several countries, particularly, those mechanisms in business transactions that protect the right of shareholders against the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers 
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measure the quality of the legal environment. LEGAL range from -2.5 to +2.5.7 I predict a negative 
coefficient on INVTPRO, EDL and LEGAL.  
Three socio-political variables are employed. The first corruption variable is the CPI variable - which 
is Transparency International’s corruption perception index (CPI). Higher values of CPI indicate less 
corruption.  A country’s CPI score can range from 0 to 100, with zero indicating high corruption levels 
and 100 indicating low corruption levels. A negative and significant association between income 
smoothing and CPI would indicate that income smoothing decreases with less corruption or perceived 
corruption.  
The second corruption variable ‘CORRUPT’ is derived from the CPI variable. I observe that the 
distribution of the CPI variable is highly skewed, that is, it has large values for some African countries 
and low values for other African countries. To reduce the observed skewed pattern in the CPI data 
distribution, I take the one-inverse of CPI time series data (i.e., one divided by each observation in the 
series) so that the CPI values for each country will now range from one to zero such that values 
approaching ‘1’ would indicate higher levels of corruption and values approaching ‘0’ would indicate 
less corruption. This inverse CPI variable is then denoted as CORRUPT, which becomes the second 
corruption variable. A positive and significant association between income smoothing and the 
CORRUPT variable would indicate that income smoothing increases with higher perceived corruption. 
Furthermore, I create a third corruption variable by taking the logarithmic transformation of the CPI 
variable as an additional correction for skewness in the CPI distribution. I take the natural logarithm of 
the CPI variable - which is now denoted as ‘logCPI’. 
Next, I introduce two additional institutional measures of corruption: ‘control of corruption’ and ‘voice 
and accountability’ indicators from the World Governance Indicator database. The fourth variable is 
the control of corruption (COC) Index.8 COC values range from -2.5 to +2.5. Higher values of COC 
indicate improved fight against corruption. A negative and significant association between control of 
corruption (COC) and income smoothing indicate that strong corruption control lowers the extent of 
income smoothing.  
The fifth variable is the Voice and accountability (VA) index developed by Kaufmann et al (2011). 9 
VA index ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 and higher VA indicate stronger voice and accountability country 
attribute. Countries with high VA have greater freedom of expression, freedom of media, and citizens 
(and employees) in such countries are more likely to engage in protests and whistle-blowing activities 
against corruption by government officials, business leaders and bank executives. In this study, I expect 
lower income smoothing among African banks in environments with high VA attribute. These three 
indices have been employed in the corruption literature to examine corruption, accountability, etc., (e.g. 
Gupta et al, 1998; Treisman, 2000; Jong-Sung and Khagram, 2005; Bird et al, 2008; Dreher and 
Schneider, 2010; Mathur and Singh, 2013). Table 2 contains information about the variables. 
 
 
                                                          
7 LEGAL is used as a proxy for the extent of legal enforcement across African countries. I did not use the investor protection variables used 
in Leuz et al (2003) and Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) because data for these proxies are either unavailable for all African countries in the 
sample, and when available are reported for at most 4 years. I use the strength of investor protection and extent of director liability developed 
based on the methodology of Djanokic, La Porta and others (2008) while LEGAL variable is Kaufman et al’s ‘rule of law’ index. These three 
variables are available and have sufficient reporting data for at least 8 years for all African countries in the sample 
8 Control of corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private grain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. It also measures the strength and effectiveness of a country’s policy 
and institutional framework to prevent and combat corruption (see. Kaufmann et al, 2011). 
9  The VA index capture perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, hold 
leaders accountable as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a freedom of the media. Citizens (and employees) in 
countries with laws that promote greater freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of media, are more likely to engage in 
protests and whistle-blowing activities against corruption by government officials, business leaders and firm executives. 
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Table 2: Information About Variables 
Variable Expected/Predicted Sign Description 
LLP Dependent Variable Loan loss provisions divided by total asset ratio  
LLPt-1 (-) Lagged Dependent Variable  Beginning of year loan loss provisions 
NPL (+) Provisions in response to actual loan loss Non-performing loans to gross loans ratio 
LOAN (+) Contemporaneous credit risk 
(-) Improved Quality of Incremental Loan 
Change in gross loan  
EBTP (+) Income Smoothing ratio of earnings before tax and provisions to total asset  
CAR (-) Capital Management Ratio of tier 1 capital to risk weighted asset for bank i at time t. 
CFEER (+) Provisions to cover risk from non-
depository activities 
Ration of net commission and fee income to total asset  
SIZE (+) Scale Effect Natural logarithm of total assets  
ΔGDP (-) Procyclical Effect Change in real gross domestic product 
INVTPRO (-) Investor Protection Minor shareholders right protection 
LEGAL (-) Investor Protection Rule of law / quality of legal system 
EDL (-) Investor Protection Extent of director liability 
CPI (+/-) Perceived Corruption Perceived corruption index 
CORRUPT (+) Perceived Corruption One-inverse of the Perceived corruption index 
logCPI (+/-) Perceived Corruption Logarithm of CPI variable 
COC (+) Institutionalised Corruption Control of corruption index 
VA (-) Institutionalised Corruption Voice and accountability 
 
Finally, to test the influence of institutional and socio-political factors on income smoothing behaviour 
among African banks, EBTP is interacted with each institutional and socio-political factor in the model. 
The coefficient of each interaction term measures the influence of the country variable on bank income 
smoothing behaviour. The extensive number of country variables and the incorporation of interaction 
terms is the main rationale for using separate regression model rather than a single regression model 
with sandwiched variables.  
 
4. Discussion of Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Table 3 report the summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables. For each bank-specific variable, 
the sample has between 1,620 and 2,572 bank-year observations, that is, on average 9 to 10 annual 
observations for each bank during 2004 to 2013. Loan loss provisions averages 0.9% of total assets. 
LLPs are higher for banks in Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia and Angola and lower for banks in Botswana, 
Namibia, Mauritius and Uganda. Non-performing loans (NPL) averages 7.89%, and is a double-digit 
higher for some North African Countries (e.g. Egypt 14.07% and Tunisia 15.01%). The high NPLs 
indicate that banks in Egypt have poor credit quality. Comparatively, NPLs are lower for banks in 
Namibia and Uganda. Loan growth (LOAN) is about 19.2%, but exhibit substantial differences across 
African countries. For instance, LOAN are much lower in Egypt while other countries experience a 
double-digit increase in gross loans over the sample period and is relatively higher for banks in Ghana 
and Angola. On average, CAR is 19.06% and is higher for banks in Angola, Nigeria and Uganda. This 
indicate that banks in Angola, Nigeria and Uganda have sufficient capital buffers for the risks they take. 
CAR is much lower for banks in Morocco and Namibia. Regarding bank size, SIZE is on average 13.45 
and is higher for banks in Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, and lower for banks in 
Namibia and Uganda. This indicate that there is a significant difference in bank size across banks in the 
sample. Earnings on average is 3.2% and is lower for banks in Senegal and Mauritius and higher for 
banks in Botswana, South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia. Fluctuations in the economic cycle (ΔGDP), on 
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average, is about 5.7% and much lower for banks in South Africa and Algeria and higher for Ethiopia, 
Angola and Nigeria This imply that the economy of South Africa and Algeria is relatively more stable 
over the sample period compared to the Nigerian economy as well as for Ethiopia and Angola. Overall, 
the result from the descriptive statistics suggest that there is wide variation across banks in several 
African countries. Appendix A1 reports the mean of the institutional and socio-political variables. 
 
Table 3: Summary of Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 report the descriptive statistics obtained from 302 sample banks from 19 countries. Data cover the 
period 2004-2013. LLP = Loan loss provisions divided by total asset. NPL = Non-performing loans to gross 
loans ratio. EBTP = ratio of earnings before tax and provisions to total asset. LOAN = change in gross loan 
outstanding (%). CAR = Ratio of tier 1 capital to risk weighted asset for bank i at time t. ΔGDP = gross 
domestic product growth rate. SIZE = natural logarithm of bank total asset. 
Country Mean 
 LLP 
Mean 
LOAN 
Mean 
SIZE 
Mean 
CAR 
Mean 
EBTP 
Mean 
ΔGDP 
Mean 
NPL 
# 
Banks 
Algeria 0.003 19.377 14.171 - 0.028 3.140 5.751 16 
Angola 0.008 33.346 13.847 21.800 0.036 10.798 5.734 14 
Botswana 0.002 22.539 12.879 13.726 0.057 7.596 9.257 12 
Cameroun 0.004 12.240 12.899 - 0.026 3.485 8.152 11 
Egypt 0.006 9.446 14.911 18.558 0.024 4.522 14.071 16 
Ethiopia 0.004 25.690 13.093 - 0.041 11.014 7.000 12 
Ghana 0.003 31.044 13.121 17.145 0.045 7.432 10.202 15 
Kenya 0.0003 22.589 12.466 19.037 0.034 5.242 10.183 24 
Mauritius 0.002 12.393 13.496 13.205 0.015 3.977 4.183 15 
Morocco 0.003 11.267 15.497 11.618 0.028 4.427 5.182 18 
Namibia 0.002 14.496 13.743 11.432 0.035 5.284 2.987 10 
Nigeria 0.010 20.071 15.557 20.671 0.032 8.782 4.919 16 
Senegal 0.006 15.479 12.703 - 0.019 3.828 7.312 10 
South Africa 0.004 16.951 14.887 15.849 0.048 3.281 7.749 29 
Tanzania 0.007 26.438 12.212 15.566 0.024 6.674 4.060 16 
Togo 0.008 23.641 12.413 17.348 0.025 3.529 10.911 7 
Tunisia 0.008 12.655 13.263 16.379 0.023 4.049 15.104 26 
Uganda 0.002 21.445 11.991 21.155 0.033 7.070 3.711 21 
Zambia 0.006 28.968 11.786 16.767 0.021 7.759 9.143 14 
         
Mean 0.009 19.206 13.454 19.059 0.032 5.741 7.899  
Median 0.005 15.750 13.216 15.375 0.027 5.170 4.940  
S.D 0.019 23.739 1.909 11.635 0.034 3.906 9.779  
Observations 2435 2317 2572 1022 2433 3017 1620  
*S.D – Standard Deviation 
 
 
Table 4 report the Pearson correlation coefficients and the associated p-values. LLPs are positive and 
significantly correlated with EBTP (0.442***). This indicate that provisions are significantly correlated 
with banks earnings among African banks. LLPs are positive and weakly correlated with SIZE (0.003) 
and suggest that provisions increase as the size of banks increase but the correlation coefficient is not 
significant. LLPs are negative and significantly correlated with ΔGDP (-0.097**), indicating that 
provisioning among African banks is procyclical with fluctuations in the business cycle. NPLs and 
LOAN are positive and significantly correlated with LLPs. This indicate that provisions are positively 
correlated with credit risk concerns among African banks. African banks are more likely to increase 
provisions when they expect problem loans. CAR is positively correlated with LLPs and indicate that 
provisions increase as Tier1 capital increase among African banks. POS is negatively correlated and 
indicate that provisions decreases with positive earnings for African banks. Overall, the correlations are 
sufficiently low to be concerned about multicollinearity. Table A2 report the Pearson correlation 
coefficients for the country variables 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Full Sample 
Table 4 report the correlation matrix. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-
values are reported in parenthesis. Bank sample consists of 302 banks in 19 countries from the period 2004-2013. Data is on 
an annual basis. LLP is loan loss provision. EBTP is earnings before taxes and provisions. LOAN is the change in gross loan 
outstanding. NPL is non-performing loan. CAR is bank capital divided by risk-weighted assets. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total asset. ΔGDP is change in gross domestic product in the bank’s country. 
Variable LLP NPL LOAN EBTP ΔGDP SIZE POS CAR 
LLP 1.000        
 (0.000)        
NPL 0.395*** 1.000       
 (0.000)        
LOAN 0.062* -0.125*** 1.000      
 (0.074) (0.000)       
EBTP 0.442*** 0.043 0.139*** 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.215) (0.000)      
ΔGDP -0.097*** -0.072** 0.252*** 0.034 1.000    
 (0.005) (0.037) (0.000) (0.325)     
SIZE 0.003 -0.101*** -0.211*** 0.078** -0.297*** 1.000   
 (0.936) (0.004) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000)    
POS -0.098*** -0.063* -0.044 0.432*** -0.088** 0.181*** 1.000  
 (0.005) (0.068) (0.208) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000)   
CAR 0.136*** 0.041 0.089** 0.242*** 0.106*** -0.279*** 0.006 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.236) (0.010) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.858)  
 
4.2. Regression Result 
4.2.1. Bank Income Smoothing 
The result is reported in Column 1 of Table 5. The EBTP coefficient is negative and insignificant for 
the full sample of African banks, contrary to the prediction. This finding does not support the findings 
from similar studies in Europe (see, Ozili, 2017b; Leventis et al, 2011, Ozili and Thankom, 2018) and 
U.S (Kilic et al, 2012). The findings also do not support the income smoothing hypothesis. This implies 
that income smoothing by banks is not uniform or widespread in most African countries.  
Next, I check whether income smoothing via loan loss provisions is present among listed banks and for 
African banks with a Big 4 auditor. The result is reported in Column 2&3 of Table 5. The EBTP 
coefficient remain insignificant suggesting that income smoothing is absent among listed African banks 
and among African banks with a Big 4 auditor. 
For the control variables, LLPt-1 coefficient is negatively significant in Column 1-3, indicating that 
African banks keep fewer provisions in the current period if they had high provisions in the previous 
period and vice versa. The NPL and LOAN coefficients report the expected sign, for instance, the NPL 
coefficient is positive and significant in Column 1-3, indicating that African banks significantly increase 
loan loss provisions when they expect high non-performing loans or problem loans. LOAN coefficient 
is also negative and significant in Column 1-3, indicating improved quality of incremental loans. The 
SIZE coefficient is negative and significant in Column 1-3, indicating that smaller African banks keep 
more loan loss provisions than larger banks. ΔGDP coefficient is positive and significant in Column 1-
3, indicating that provisioning is counter-cyclical with fluctuations in the business cycle, and this might 
be due to banks reporting higher provisions during good economic times possibly due to the strong 
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regulatory and supervisory requirements requiring banks to keep higher provisions for loans issued to 
risky sectors during lending booms associated with good economic times in the African region. 
Table 5: Income Smoothing (full sample)  
Equation: LLPi,t = c + LLPi,t-1 + NPLi,t + LOANi,t + CARi,t + SIZEi,t + EBTPi,t + ΔGDPi,j + 
εi,t. 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM first-difference estimator for 
panel data with lagged dependent variable. Bank-specific fixed effects, year and country fixed 
effect are included. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Variables Full Sample Listed vs Non-Listed Big4 vs Non-Big4 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LLPt-1 -0.227** 
(-2.33) 
-0.237** 
(-2.39) 
-0.241** 
(-2.52) 
NPL 0.0009*** 
(3.57) 
0.001*** 
(3.61) 
0.001*** 
(3.79) 
LOAN -0.0004*** 
(-6.57) 
-0.0004*** 
(-6.76) 
-0.0004*** 
(-7.09) 
CAR -0.0004** 
(-2.35) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.43) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.27) 
SIZE -0.019** 
(-2.53) 
-0.020** 
(-2.43) 
-0.019** 
(-2.45) 
EBTP -0.041 
(-0.43) 
-0.006 
(-0.04) 
0.033 
(0.07) 
ΔGDP 0.003*** 
(3.12) 
0.003*** 
(2.83) 
0.002*** 
(2.73) 
LISTED*EBTP  -0.065 
(-0.31) 
 
BIG4*EBTP   -0.096 
(-0.19) 
Sargan/J-Statistic 26.99 27.39 26.59 
P(J-statistic) 0.57 0.49 54.03 
No of observation 652 652 652 
 
4.2.2. Institutions: investor protection 
In this section, I test the effect of investor protection on bank income smoothing. I focus on three 
investor protection variables: strong protection of minority shareholders’ rights (INVTPRO), extent of 
director liability (EDL), and quality of the legal system (LEGAL). Table 6 reports the results. The 
INVTPRO*EBTP, EDL*EBTP and LEGAL*EBTP coefficients are negatively significant, as expected 
in Column 1, 2 and 3. The INVTPRO*EBTP coefficient is negatively significant at the 5% level, which 
indicates that strong protection of minority shareholders’ rights mitigates or lowers income smoothing 
by African banks. This result is consistent with Leuz et al (2003), Ozili (2018) and Fonseca and 
Gonzalez (2008)’s cross-country studies. The EDL*EBTP coefficient is also negative and significant 
at 1% level, indicating that income smoothing by African banks decreases with greater director liability. 
The LEGAL*EBTP coefficient is negative but insignificant and imply that the quality of the legal 
system across African countries is not significantly associated with income smoothing by African 
banks.  
The positive coefficients for the INVTPRO and EDL binary variables indicate that greater minority 
shareholder protection and greater director liability might have some positive effects in ensuring that 
African banks keep high provisions, but this effect is not significant. The positive coefficient for 
‘LEGAL’ (in column 5) indicates that legal system quality can have a positive effect on the level of 
provisions among African banks while the negative coefficient for LEGAL (in column 3,4) indicate 
that legal system quality can have a negative effect on the level of provisions among African banks, but 
the LEGAL coefficient is not significant as reported in Columns 3,4 & 5.  
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Moreover, I expect some complementarity. I expect that the strength of protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights (INVTPRO) and the extent of director liability (EDL) will both depend on the 
quality of the legal system in the country (LEGAL). Therefore, to test this complementary effect, I 
interact the INVTPRO and EDL variables with the LEGAL variable. The result is reported in Column 
4 and 5 of Table 6. The LEGAL*INVTPTO*EBTP and LEGAL*EDL*EBTP coefficients are negative 
but not significant. This does not confirm the expected complementarity. 
Table 6: Bank income smoothing and investor protection variables 
Equation: LLPi,t = c + LLPi,t-1 + NPLi,t + LOANi,t + CARi,t + SIZEi,t + EBTPi,t + ΔGDPi,j + EDL + EDL*EBTP + 
INVTPRO + INVTPRO*EBTP + LEGAL + LEGAL*EBTP + LEGAL*INVTPRO*EBTP + LEGAL*EDL*EBTP + εi,t. 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged 
dependent variables. Bank-specific fixed effects, year and country dummies are included. LLP is loan loss provision. EBTP 
is earnings before taxes and provisions. LLPt-1 is lagged dependent variable. LOAN is change in gross loan outstanding. 
NPL is non-performing loan. CAR is bank capital divided by risk-weighted assets. SIZE is natural logarithm of total asset. 
ΔGDP is change in gross domestic product in the bank’s country. INVTPRO, EDL, LEGAL measure the strength of 
investor protection, the extent of director liability, and the quality of the legal system in the country, respectively. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Variables Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
LLPt-1 -0.258*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.279*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.175* 
(1.94) 
-0.618** 
(-2.56) 
-0.618*** 
(-2.80) 
NPL 0.001*** 
(3.97) 
0.001*** 
(3.85) 
0.001*** 
(3.21) 
0.003** 
(2.56) 
0.003*** 
(2.69) 
LOAN -0.0004*** 
(-7.06) 
-0.0004*** 
(-7.31) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.0007** 
(-2.25) 
-0.0007* 
(-1.95) 
CAR -0.0004** 
(-2.01) 
-0.0003* 
(-1.67) 
-0.00009 
(-0.49) 
-0.0002 
(-0.44) 
-0.0004 
(-0.68) 
SIZE -0.015** 
(-2.03) 
-0.018** 
(-2.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
-0.019 
(-1.06) 
-0.018 
(-0.95) 
EBTP 0.998** 
(1.98) 
0.542** 
(2.14) 
0.264 
(1.23) 
-0.312 
(-0.92) 
-0.322 
(-0.74) 
ΔGDP 0.002** 
(2.31) 
0.002** 
(2.14) 
0.0006 
(0.58) 
0.005 
(1.52) 
0.004 
(0.98) 
INVTPRO 0.002 
(0.19) 
  0.023 
(0.99) 
 
INVTPRO*EBTP -0.164** 
(-2.28) 
    
EDL  0.002 
(0.15) 
  0.018 
(0.64) 
EDL*EBTP  -0.109*** 
(-2.72) 
   
LEGAL   -0.012 
(-0.24) 
-0.019 
(-0.33) 
0.035 
(0.47) 
LEGAL*EBTP   -0.391 
(-0.59) 
  
LEGAL*INVTPRO*EBTP    -0.036 
(-0.26) 
 
LEGAL*EDL*EBTP     -0.163 
(-0.91) 
Sargan/J-Statistic 27.11 27.31 8.16 3.84 3.45 
P(J-Statistic) 0.46 0.45 0.77 0.97 0.98 
No of banks 142 142 124 124 124 
Observations 652 652 437 437 437 
 
4.2.3. Corruption: Further Tests 
Perceived Corruption: 
The GMM regression results are reported in Table 7. The CPI*EBTP coefficient are negative and 
insignificant in column 1, indicating that the level of perceived corruption is not significantly associated 
with income smoothing among African banks. Secondly, I adjust for skewness in the CPI data by taking 
the one-inverse of the CPI distribution i.e. one divided by each CPI observation, and this produces a 
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new variable ‘CORRUPT’ which I interact with the EBTP variable. The CORRUPT*EBTP coefficient 
is positive and insignificant in column 2, indicating that the level of perceived corruption has no 
significant effect on income smoothing among African banks. Thirdly, I again adjust for skewness in 
the CPI data by taking the logarithm of the CPI data. The result is reported in Column 3 of Table 7. The 
LogCPI*EBTP coefficient remain negative and insignificant after adjusting for skewness, indicating 
that the level of perceived corruption is not significantly associated with income smoothing among 
African banks. Finally, the insignificance of the CPI*EBTP, LogCPI*EBTP and CORRUPT*EBTP 
coefficients might be because CPI captures ‘perceived corruption’ and not ‘actual corruption’, 
nonetheless, the CPI indicator is a widely used corruption indicator in the corruption literature.10  
Institutionalised Corruption: 
High levels of voice and accountability in society is a result of less corruption. The VA variable is 
interacted with the EBTP variable and the result is reported in Column 4. The VA*EBTP coefficient is 
negative and insignificant indicating that greater voice and accountability does not significantly 
influence the extent of income smoothing among African banks. Also, the COC*EBTP coefficient is 
positive and insignificant, and imply that stronger corruption control is not significantly associated with 
income smoothing among African banks.  
Furthermore, I expect that strong corruption control in a country should also improve the voice and 
accountability level of the country. To test this complementary effect, I interact the VA and COC 
variables with the EBTP variable ‘VA*COC*EBTP’, to detect whether strong corruption control and 
accountability levels can jointly influence the extent of bank income smoothing. The result is reported 
in Table 7. VA*COC*EBTP coefficient is negative and insignificant. This does not confirm the 
expected complementarity for the countries examined.  
Corruption Cluster: 
In this section, I perform a cluster analysis using a cluster variable ‘CL’. The cluster variable is derived 
from the average of the sum of the VA, COC and CPI variables because the three variables move in the 
same direction, that is, higher VA, COC and CPI indicates less corruption. The rationale for this 
robustness test is to check whether the joint effect of the corruption variable might have some significant 
effect on income smoothing by African banks. The result is reported in Column 7 of Table 7. The 
CL*EBTP coefficient is negative and insignificant. 
Table 7: Corruption and income smoothing 
Equation: LLPi,t = c + LLPi,t-1 + NPLi,t + LOANi,t + CARi,t + SIZEi,t + EBTPi,t + ΔGDPi,j + CORRUPT + 
CORRUPT*EBTP + COC + COC*EBTP + VA + VA*EBTP + VA*COC*EBTP + εi,t. 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM first-difference estimator for panel data with lagged 
dependent variables. Bank-specific fixed effects, year and country dummies are included. LLP is loan loss provision. EBTP is 
earnings before taxes and provisions. LLPt-1 is lagged dependent variable. LOAN is change in gross loan outstanding. NPL is 
non-performing loan. CAR is bank capital divided by risk-weighted assets. SIZE is natural logarithm of total asset. ΔGDP is 
change in gross domestic product in the bank’s country. CORRUPT is one-inverse of the perceived corruption index. CPI is 
perceived corruption index. LogCPI is the natural logarithm of the CPI variable. COC is control of corruption. VA is voice 
and accountability. CL is a cluster variable which is the average of CPI, VA and COC variables. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Variables Perceived Corruption Institutionalised 
Corruption 
Interaction Cluster 
Analysis 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
LLPt-1 -0.339*** 
(3.46) 
-0.219** 
(-2.39) 
-0.279*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.266** 
(-2.44) 
-0.438** 
(-2.25) 
-0.333* 
(-1.79) 
-0.287*** 
(-3.19) 
NPL 0.002*** 
(4.42) 
0.001*** 
(3.04) 
0.001*** 
(3.86) 
0.001*** 
(3.16) 
0.001 
(1.63) 
0.001 
(1.62) 
0.001*** 
(2.96) 
LOAN -0.0003*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.0002*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.0002*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.0006*** 
(-8.24) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.29) 
-0.0003* 
(-1.77) 
-0.0004*** 
(-8.77) 
CAR 0.00001 0.00001 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0001 
                                                          
10 There is yet no metric that accurately capture actual (or, real) corruption. 
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(0.03) (0.06) (-0.16) (-1.22) (0.92) (-1.36) (0.36) 
SIZE -0.002 
(-0.86) 
-0.003 
(-1.43) 
-0.002 
(-1.13) 
-0.006* 
(-1.99) 
-0.003 
(-0.91) 
-0.007 
(-1.25) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.68) 
EBTP 0.369 
(1.24) 
0.083 
(0.47) 
0.512 
(0.61) 
-0.188 
(-1.31) 
0.063 
(0.47) 
0.218 
(1.21) 
-0.086 
(-0.84) 
ΔGDP 0.001* 
(1.77) 
0.001* 
(1.83) 
0.0006* 
(1.73) 
0.002*** 
(4.38) 
0.001 
(1.21) 
0.0009 
(1.13) 
0.001*** 
(3.05) 
CPI 
 
0.0002 
(1.29) 
      
CPI*EBTP -0.003 
(-1.05) 
      
CORRUPT  -1.235 
(-1.15) 
     
CORRUPT*EBT
P 
 2.963 
(0.27) 
     
LogCPI   0.014 
(1.06) 
    
LogCPI*EBTP   -0.091 
(-0.48) 
    
VA      -0.001 
(-0.04) 
 -0.04 
(-1.53) 
 
VA*EBTP    -0.127 
(-0.52) 
   
COC     0.003 
(0.11) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
 
COC*EBTP     0.412 
(1.25) 
  
VA*COC*EBTP      -1.098 
(-1.24) 
 
CL       0.0003 
(0.15) 
CL*EBTP       -0.037 
(-0.91) 
Sargan/J-Statistic 21.28 19.90 21.02 21.98 13.78 8.53 22.27 
P(J-Statistic) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
No of banks 134 134 134 142 124 124 142 
Observations 544 544 544 652 437 437 652 
 
Correlation of Corruption and Income smoothing variables: 
Here, I address concerns of correlation between income smoothing and corruption. I check whether 
there is a significant correlation between the EBTP variable and the corruption variables. The 
correlation matrix is reported below in Table 8. As can be seen from the EBTP column below, the 
highest correlation coefficient is 13% and lowest correlation coefficient is 6.6%. 
 
Table 8: Correlation for Income smoothing and the corruption variables 
      
      Variable EBTP COC CPI CORRUPT VA 
EBTP 1.000     
      
      
COC 0.102*** 1.000    
 (0.000)     
      
CPI -0.066*** -0.924*** 1.000   
 (0.003) (0.000)    
      
CORRUPT 0.108*** 0.933*** -0.920*** 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
      
VA 0.130*** 0.666*** -0.515*** 0.571*** 1.000 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
      
      
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
4.3. Additional Tests 
4.3.1. Positive Earnings and Corruption: 
Earlier, I did not find evidence for income smoothing using provisions, in the full sample. In this section, 
I divide the entire earnings distribution into two: positive earnings and negative earnings. I use a binary 
variable (POS) that takes the value ‘1’ when EBTP is positive, and ‘0’ when EBTP is negative. POS 
dummy is then interacted with EBTP. The result is reported in Table 9. POS*EBTP coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating that African banks use provisions to smooth positive 
earnings. Furthermore, I interact POS*EBTP with the ‘perceived’ and ‘institutional’ corruption 
variables. Of all the interaction terms, POS*EBTP and CORRUPT*POS*EBTP are positively 
significant, indicating that income smoothing increases with higher corruption levels. 
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Table 9: Positive Earnings and Corruption 
Equation: LLPi,t = c + LLPi,t-1 + NPLi,t + LOANi,t + CARi,t + SIZEi,t + EBTPi,t + ΔGDPi,j + POS + CORRUPT + VA + COC + 
CPI*POS*EBTP + LogCPI*EBTP + CORRUPT*POS*EBTP + VA*POS*EBTP + COC*POS*EBTP + εi,t. 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent 
variables. Bank-specific fixed effects, year and country dummies are included. Bank-level and country variables remain as previously 
defined. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
LLPt-1 -0.331*** 
(-3.19) 
0.479*** 
(15.47) 
-0.086 
(-0.78) 
-0.461** 
(-2.46) 
-0.033 
(-0.33) 
0.513 
(17.23) 
-0.292*** 
(-3.17) 
NPL 0.0001*** 
(3.13) 
0.0003*** 
(7.92) 
0.0009** 
(2.47) 
0.002** 
(2.38) 
0.0004 
(0.85) 
0.0003*** 
(7.47) 
0.001*** 
(3.04) 
LOAN -0.0005*** 
(-8.53) 
-0.0004*** 
(3.19) 
-0.0005*** 
(-5.44) 
-0.0006** 
(-2.51) 
-0.0002*** 
(-3.20) 
0.00004*** 
(2.67) 
-0.0004*** 
(-8.42) 
CAR -0.0001 
(-0.49) 
0.0001** 
(2.15) 
-0.0008*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.0002 
(-0.44) 
-0.0001 
(-0.34) 
0.00004 
(1.08) 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
SIZE -0.009*** 
(-3.57) 
0.0004*** 
(4.23) 
-0.008 
(-0.89) 
-0.024 
(-1.55) 
-0.005** 
(-2.01) 
0.0004*** 
(3.43) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.53) 
EBTP -2.287** 
(-2.29) 
0.042 
(1.39) 
-0.311* 
(-1.89) 
-0.226 
(-0.92) 
-0.336 
(-1.27) 
-0.133** 
(-2.32) 
-0.155 
(-1.50) 
ΔGDP 0.001*** 
(3.05) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.94) 
0.002** 
(2.58) 
0.005** 
(2.21) 
-0.0001 
(-0.15) 
-0.0003*** 
(-2.99) 
0.001*** 
(3.03) 
POS 0.018 
(0.94) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.36) 
0.025 
(1.09) 
0.003 
(0.10) 
-0.008 
(-0.56) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0002 
(-0.002) 
POS*EBTP 1.336** 
(1.96) 
      
CORRUPT  -0.147* 
(-1.76) 
     
CPI     -0.0002* 
(-1.86) 
  
LogCPI      -0.001 
(-1.42) 
 
VA   -0.094*** 
(2.78) 
    
COC    0.025 
(0.75) 
   
CL       -0.0002 
(-0.11) 
POS*CORRUPT*EBTP  6.493*** 
(3.56) 
     
VA*POS*EBTP   
 
0.046 
(0.19) 
    
COC*POS*EBTP    -0.141 
(-0.28) 
   
POS*LogCPI*EBTP      0.068*** 
(5.03) 
 
POS*CPI*EBTP     0.008*** 
(2.62) 
  
POS*CL*EBTP       -0.021 
(-0.51) 
Sargan/J-Statistic 19.23 20.88 19.27 8.32 22.17 19.37 21.35 
P(J-Statistic) 0.02 39.26 0.82 0.68 0.01 0.01 0.02 
No of banks 142 134 142 124 134 134 142 
Observations 652 544 652 437 544 544 652 
 
4.3.2. Positive Earnings and Investor Protection: 
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The ‘POS’ binary variable is then interacted with EBTP and the investor protection variables. The result 
is reported in Table 10. The EDL*POS*EBTP coefficient is negatively significant, indicating that 
strong investor protection reduces the smoothing of positive earnings by African banks. 
Table 10: Positive Earnings and Investor Protection 
Equation: LLPi,t = c + LLPi,t-1 + NPLi,t + LOANi,t + CARi,t + SIZEi,t + EBTPi,t + ΔGDPi,j + POS + INVTPRO + 
LEGAL + EDL + INVTPRO*POS*EBTP + EDL*POS*EBTP + LEGAL*POS*EBTP + εi,t. 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged 
dependent variables. Bank-specific fixed effects, year and country dummies are included. Bank-level and country 
variables remain as previously defined. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
LLPt-1 -0.284*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.299*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.441*** 
(-3.06) 
NPL 0.001*** 
(3.63) 
0.001*** 
(3.38) 
0.002*** 
(2.63) 
LOAN -0.0004*** 
(-6.69) 
-0.0004*** 
(-7.17) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.96) 
CAR -0.0004** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0003* 
(-1.66) 
-0.0003 
(-0.97) 
SIZE -0.016** 
(-2.15) 
-0.015** 
(-2.08) 
-0.011 
(-0.98) 
EBTP 0.565 
(1.23) 
0.509** 
(2.11) 
-0.083 
(-0.33) 
ΔGDP 0.002*** 
(2.59) 
0.002** 
(2.23) 
0.002 
(0.87) 
POS -0.013 
(-0.75) 
-0.011 
(-0.77) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
INVTPRO 0.003 
(0.33) 
  
EDL  0.0009 
(0.08) 
 
LEGAL   -0.006 
(-0.11) 
INVTPRO*POS*EBTP -0.091 
(-1.44) 
  
EDL*POS*EBTP  -0.094** 
(-2.49) 
 
LEGAL*POS*EBTP   -0.799 
(-1.12) 
Sargan/J-Statistic 26.43 27.94 6.95 
P(J-Statistic) 0.44 0.36 0.80 
No of banks 142 142 124 
Observations 652 652 437 
 
4.3.3. Bank Size and Earnings Smoothing: Size Hypothesis. 
In this section, I test the effect of bank size on the income smoothing behaviour of African banks. The 
size hypothesis, based on the political cost hypothesis of Watt and Zimmerman (1986), argue that 
managers of large firms will use accounting procedures that decrease the size of current earnings if 
earnings is too high in order to avoid scrutiny of bank profit by firm regulators. They argue that, because 
the behaviour or actions of large firms are more politically sensitive compared to smaller firms, 
managers of large banks will prefer to use accounting procedures that decrease current earnings for fear 
of regulatory action. Hence, the larger the firm, the more likely the manager will select accounting 
procedures that decrease the size of current earnings. Earnings smoothing via provisions is one possible 
technique that large African banks could use to decrease the size of current earnings.  
To test the size hypothesis, I use positive earnings as a proxy for high and substantial bank earnings in 
the current period and I interact POS with SIZE and EBTP. The SIZE*POS*EBTP interaction variable 
allows us to detect whether larger banks smooth positive and substantial earnings, in line with the size 
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hypothesis. Column 4 of Table 11 report the results. I did not find evidence to support the size 
hypothesis, although I observe that income smoothing is inversely and significantly associated with 
bank size as indicated by the SIZE*EBTP coefficient in Column 3 which suggests that larger banks do 
not use provisions to smooth income. 
4.3.4. Pre and Post-Crisis Analysis 
Next, I investigate whether African banks engage in aggressive income smoothing during the post-
financial crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period.11 The POST binary variable takes the value ‘0’ 
for the pre-crisis period from 2004 to 2007 and take the value ‘1’ for the post-crisis period from 2009 
to 2013. The result is reported in Table 11 Column 1 and 2. The POST*EBTP coefficient is positive 
and insignificant and imply that income smoothing is not pronounced in the post-crisis period compared 
to the pre-crisis period. However, the POST*POS*EBTP coefficient is positively significant at the 10% 
level and imply that African banks use loan loss provisions to smooth positive earnings in the post-
crisis era. 
Table 11: Size, Pre-Crisis and Post-Crisis Regression 
Equation: LLPi,t = c + LLPi,t-1 + NPLi,t + LOANi,t + CARi,t + SIZEi,t + EBTPi,t + ΔGDPi,j + POST + 
POST*EBTP + POS + POST*POS*EBTP + SIZE*EBTP + SIZE*POS*EBTP + εi,t. 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data 
with lagged dependent variables. Bank-specific fixed effects, year and country dummies are included. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, 
respectively. 
Variables Pre-and Post-Crisis Size Hypothesis 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
LLPt-1 -0.235*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.226** 
(-2.50) 
-0.328*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.250** 
(-2.51) 
NPL 0.001*** 
(3.29) 
0.001*** 
(2.97) 
0.001*** 
(3.50) 
0.001*** 
(3.74) 
LOAN -0.0002** 
(-2.31) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.12) 
-0.0005*** 
(-7.87) 
-0.0004*** 
(-5.94) 
CAR -0.0007*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.0006** 
(-2.27) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.04) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.21) 
SIZE -0.037*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.039*** 
(-2.59) 
0.005 
(0.57) 
-0.016** 
(-1.91) 
EBTP -0.083 
(-0.70) 
-0.097 
(-0.80) 
2.157*** 
(3.74) 
0.137 
(0.31) 
ΔGDP 0.0008 
(0.85) 
0.0006 
(0.67) 
0.003*** 
(3.24) 
0.003*** 
(2.65) 
POST -0.011 
(-0.30) 
-0.015 
(-0.45) 
  
POST*EBTP 0.153 
(1.35) 
   
POS  -0.0006 
(-0.03) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.01) 
POST*POS*EBTP  0.208* 
(1.73) 
  
SIZE*EBTP   -0.179*** 
(-4.03) 
 
SIZE*POS*EBTP    -0.018 
(-0.50) 
Sargan/J-Statistic 19.20 17.77 27.63 27.27 
P(J-Statistic) 0.69 0.72 0.48 0.45 
No of banks 139 139 142 142 
Observations 652 652 652 652 
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4.3.5. Country-Specific Regression 
Next, I estimate country-specific regressions for income smoothing. The results are reported in Table 
12 & 13. The EBTP coefficient is positive, significant and insignificant for some African countries; and 
negative, significant and insignificant for banks in other African countries. This indicate evidence of 
cross-country differences in income smoothing among African banks. 
Table 12: County-Specific OLS Regression (with lagged LLP) 
Equation: LLPi,t = c + LLPi,t-1 + NPLi,t + LOANi,t + CARi,t + SIZEi,t + EBTPi,t + ΔGDPi,j + εi,t. 
Table 10 report country-specific regressions for 19 countries. Regression is estimated using panel OLS regression. Regressions 
include lagged dependent variable and White’s robust standard error correction. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively 
Country C LLPt-1 NPL LOAN SIZE CAR EBTP ΔGDP Adj 
R² 
F-stat 
Algeria 0.029 
(1.38) 
0.131 
(0.75) 
0.001*** 
(3.17) 
-0.00001 
(-0.32) 
-0.003** 
(-2.16) 
 -0.024 
(-0.96) 
0.003*** 
(3.09) 
81.5 14.25 
Angola 0.012* 
(1.77) 
3.612*** 
(9.07) 
-0.0003 
(-1.63) 
-0.00003 
(-0.91) 
-0.0005 
(-1.13) 
-0.00009 
(-1.11) 
0.015 
(0.21) 
-0.0001 
(-0.71) 
81.3 8.43 
Botswana 0.029** 
(2.34) 
0.418*** 
(5.37) 
0.0009*** 
(3.88) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.06) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.16) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.92) 
-0.049 
(-1.25) 
-0.00001 
(-0.07) 
86.6 
 
24.98 
Cameroun 0.054*** 
(5.91) 
0.552*** 
(5.43) 
0.0001 
(0.52) 
-0.0001 
(-1.36) 
-0.005*** 
(-4.53) 
 0.366*** 
(5.36) 
0.0002 
(0.12) 
79.9 21.50 
Egypt -0.018 
(-1.39) 
0.413*** 
(3.89) 
0.0001 
(1.18) 
0.0002 
(1.52) 
0.0009 
(1.27) 
-0.0002 
(-0.94) 
0.017 
(0.25) 
0.0008 
(1.36) 
49.8 
 
4.54 
Ethiopia 0.032** 
(2.35) 
-0.192 
(0.50) 
0.0006*** 
(4.21) 
0.0001** 
(2.45) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.73) 
 0.353** 
(1.99) 
-0.0009 
(-1.08) 
54.2 5.54 
Ghana 0.018 
(1.05) 
0.307 
(1.43) 
-0.0001* 
(-1.98) 
0.00001 
(1.08) 
-0.001 
(-1.20) 
-0.00004 
(-0.75) 
0.020 
(1.25) 
-0.0001 
(-0.71) 
-13.7 0.57 
Kenya 0.00001 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.16) 
-0.000004 
(-0.86) 
0.00005 
(1.43) 
-0.000001 
(-0.03) 
0.00001 
(0.76) 
0.004 
(0.69) 
-0.00006 
(-0.89) 
-1.02 0.81 
Mauritius 0.002 
(0.43) 
0.092 
(0.75) 
0.0002* 
(1.76) 
0.00002 
(1.37) 
-0.0003 
(-1.19) 
0.00005 
(1.51) 
-0.003 
(-0.11) 
0.0004 
(0.84) 
9.1 1.73 
Morocco 0.018* 
(1.94) 
0.665** 
(2.28) 
0.001 
(1.44) 
-0.0001 
(-1.12) 
-0.001* 
(-1.82) 
-0.0004 
(-1.10) 
-0.218* 
(-1.82) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.08) 
77.9 14.11 
Namibia 0.004 
(0.71) 
0.228 
(1.55) 
-0.00002 
(-0.33) 
0.00002 
(0.54) 
-0.0005 
(-1.20) 
0.00009 
(1.36) 
0.057** 
(2.64) 
0.0002 
(1.27) 
31.3 
 
4.12 
Nigeria 0.072 
(1.59) 
-0.035 
(-0.26) 
-0.0003** 
(-2.07) 
-0.00004 
(-0.71) 
-0.005* 
(-1.84) 
0.0003 
(1.48) 
0.033 
(0.40) 
0.002 
(1.55) 
10.5 1.47 
Senegal -0.022* 
(-1.68) 
0.589*** 
(5.95) 
0.00007 
(0.89) 
0.00003 
(0.40) 
0.0002 
(1.33) 
- 0.003 
(0.02) 
0.0003 
(0.59) 
32.8 4.58 
South 
Africa 
0.013 
(1.40) 
0.415*** 
(9.39) 
-0.00003 
(-0.63) 
0.00009* 
(1.81) 
-0.0004 
(-1.23) 
-0.0004 
(-1.17) 
-0.0006 
(-0.01) 
-0.0006** 
(-1.98) 
54.4 24.48 
Tanzania 0.032** 
(2.27) 
-0.140 
(-0.92) 
0.001*** 
(4.05) 
-0.0001* 
(-2.37) 
-0.003** 
(-2.24) 
-0.00008 
(-0.37) 
0.115 
(1.36) 
0.0005 
(0.68) 
35.4 8.58 
Togo -0.271 
(-0.71) 
0.551 
(0.39) 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
-0.000002 
(-0.01) 
0.015 
(0.74) 
-0.0007 
(-0.15) 
1.289 
(1.00) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-
18.93 
0.82 
Tunisia 0.021 
(1.19) 
0.415*** 
(3.49) 
-0.0002 
(-1.67) 
-0.00001 
(-0.39) 
-0.001 
(-1.01) 
0.00003 
(0.36) 
-0.059 
(-0.89) 
0.0003 
(1.38) 
52.18 6.92 
Uganda 0.011** 
(2.28) 
0.106 
(0.79) 
0.0003*** 
(2.85) 
0.00004* 
(1.90) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.00003 
(-0.42) 
0.044** 
(2.48) 
0.0001 
(0.83) 
2.11 1.30 
Zambia 0.014 
(0.84) 
0.024 
(0.20) 
-0.0002 
(-1.15) 
0.000003 
(0.08) 
-0.002 
(-1.56) 
0.0002 
(1.24) 
0.052 
(0.83) 
0.002*** 
(3.13) 
26.10 2.36 
*I did not use GMM for this regression because the GMM estimation breaks down for some country-estimations due to missing data 
or insufficient number of observations for some countries. To address this issue, I run the country regressions using the pooled-cross-
section OLS estimator to provide consistent results for all countries in the sample 
Note: Some regressions do not have CAR variable because tier1 capital ratio is not reported for sample banks in Algeria, Cameroun, 
Ethiopia, Senegal, since these countries do not use Basel capital standards  
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Table 13: County-Specific OLS Regression (without Lagged LLP) 
Equation: LLPi,t = c + LLPi,t-1 + NPLi,t + LOANi,t + CARi,t + SIZEi,t + EBTPi,t + ΔGDPi,j + CORRUPT + CORRUPT*EBTP + COC + 
COC*EBTP + VA + VA*EBTP + VA*COC*EBTP + εi,t. 
Table 11 report country-specific regressions for 19 countries. Regression is pooled panel regression with White’s robust standard error 
correction. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Country C NPL LOAN SIZE CAR EBTP ΔGDP Adj R² F-stat 
Algeria 0.025 
(1.17) 
0.0009*** 
(4.96) 
-0.00002 
(-0.74) 
-0.002 
(-1.63) 
 -0.065** 
(-5.29) 
0.002** 
(2.35) 
52.94 5.50 
Angola -0.013 
(-0.44) 
0.0006*** 
(26.85) 
-0.00002 
(-1.09) 
0.0009 
(0.36) 
-0.0002 
(-1.01) 
0.057 
(0.69) 
0.0002 
(0.75) 
48.82 2.91 
Botswana 0.039** 
(2.27) 
0.0009*** 
(4.65) 
-0.00008** 
(-2.15) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.14) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.045 
(-1.63) 
-0.00001 
(-0.07) 
82.27 
 
21.89 
Cameroun 0.095*** 
(4.48) 
0.0007*** 
(2.42) 
-0.000004 
(-0.09) 
-0.009*** 
(-5.59) 
 0.433*** 
(4.29) 
0.002* 
(1.80) 
60.81 11.24 
Egypt -0.013 
(-0.75) 
0.0002** 
(2.36) 
0.0001*** 
(3.49) 
0.0005 
(0.58) 
-0.0002 
(-1.56) 
0.013 
(0.17) 
0.002*** 
(3.15) 
28.68 
 
2.81 
Ethiopia 0.016* 
(1.68) 
0.0005*** 
(2.89) 
0.00008** 
(2.26) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.54) 
 0.302** 
(2.77) 
-0.0001 
(-0.25) 
50.33 6.88 
Ghana 0.022** 
(2.03) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.24) 
0.00001* 
(1.76) 
-0.001* 
(-1.93) 
-0.00005 
(-1.28) 
0.004 
(0.19) 
-0.00004 
(-1.28) 
-16.24 0.42 
Kenya -0.005 
(-1.04) 
0.000008 
(0.64) 
0.000005 
(1.18) 
0.0003 
(1.03) 
0.00004 
(1.22) 
0.005 
(0.92) 
0.00005 
(0.41) 
4.34 2.07 
Mauritius 0.002 
(0.37) 
0.0002* 
(1.85) 
0.00002 
(1.51) 
-0.0002 
(-0.98) 
0.00005 
(1.24) 
-0.003 
(-0.10) 
0.0004 
(0.86) 
9.32 1.89 
Morocco 0.037** 
(2.28) 
0.001* 
(1.75) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.60) 
-0.001* 
(-1.89) 
-0.0006 
(-1.33) 
-0.189 
(-1.48) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.91) 
62.10 8.37 
Namibia 0.008 
(1.13) 
-0.00004 
(-0.59) 
-0.000004 
(-0.11) 
-0.0008 
(-1.49) 
0.00005 
(0.64) 
0.087*** 
(2.92) 
0.0003 
(1.65) 
22.81 
 
3.36 
Nigeria 0.053 
(1.37) 
0.002 
(0.89) 
-0.00002 
(-0.22) 
-0.003 
(-1.22) 
0.00002 
(0.04) 
0.06612 
(0.69) 
-0.0009 
(-0.36) 
4.47 1.25 
Senegal -0.014 
(-0.57) 
-0.0002 
(-0.69) 
-0.00001 
(-0.23) 
0.0009 
(0.47) 
- 0.271* 
(1.87) 
0.0005 
(1.30) 
15.09 2.78 
South Africa 0.018 
(1.28) 
-0.00003 
(-0.21) 
0.0001** 
(2.61) 
-0.0007 
(-1.27) 
-0.0006 
(-1.24) 
0.088 
(1.42) 
-0.0005 
(-0.87) 
17.81 6.06 
Tanzania 0.029*** 
(2.06) 
0.0009*** 
(5.99) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.58) 
-0.002** 
(-2.20) 
-0.00002 
(-0.08) 
0.104 
(1.31) 
0.0002 
(0.33) 
35.20 9.78 
Togo -0.153* 
(-1.85) 
0.002** 
(2.21) 
-0.00001 
(-0.09) 
0.008* 
(1.94) 
-0.001 
(-1.63) 
0.823* 
(1.68) 
0.0003 
(0.22) 
45.76 2.27 
Tunisia 0.023 
(0.69) 
0.0002 
(0.53) 
-0.00001 
(-0.22) 
-0.002 
(-0.86) 
0.0004 
(1.60) 
-0.015 
(-0.06) 
0.0005* 
(1.69) 
21.96 2.92 
Uganda 0.008* 
(1.66) 
0.0002*** 
(3.28) 
0.00003* 
(1.73) 
-0.0008** 
(-2.35) 
-0.000004 
(-0.08) 
0.027*** 
(3.25) 
0.0002 
(0.91) 
1.08 1.19 
Zambia 0.015 
(0.90) 
-0.0002 
(1.26) 
0.000003 
(0.11) 
-0.002 
(-1.64) 
0.0002 
(1.26) 
0.055 
(0.89) 
0.002*** 
(3.14) 
29.51 2.88 
I did not use GMM for this regression because the GMM estimation breaks down for some country-estimations due to missing data or 
insufficient number of observations for some countries. To address this issue, I run the country regressions using the pooled-cross-section 
OLS estimator to provide consistent results for all countries in the sample 
Note: Some regressions do not have CAR variable because tier1 capital ratio is not reported for sample banks in Algeria, Cameroun, Ethiopia, 
Senegal, since these countries do not use Basel capital standards 
 
 
4.4. Regional Comparison 
In this section, I compare the result for African banks with that of studies from Europe and Asia.  
                                                          
12 For example, the result for Nigeria show that Nigerian banks do not use loan loss provisions to smooth income during the period analysed, 
and this result is consistent with Ozili and Outa (2018). 
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European studies such as Olszak et al (2017) find that strong investor protection and more restrictive 
bank capital regulations reduce the procyclicality of LLP in banks while Ozili and Thankom (2018) 
find that income smoothing is more evident in systemic banks than in non-systemic European banks. 
Bouvatier et al (2014) examine European banks and find that income smoothing is pronounced among 
European banks with concentrated ownership while income smoothing is reduced in European countries 
with strict regulations. Curcio and Hasan (2015) examine Euro area and non-Euro area banks, and finds 
that higher investor protection significantly reduces the incentives to smooth earnings for Euro Area 
banks. Also, during the recent financial crisis, Euro Area bank managers were much more concerned 
with their credit portfolio quality and did not use loan loss provisions for income smoothing and other 
discretionary purposes. Taken together, the evidence for the effect of investor protection in previous 
European studies is consistent with the results for Africa banks in this study, and suggests that investor 
protection can discourage managerial opportunistic behaviour in banks across most regions particularly 
the African and European regions. In the Asian region, Wu et al. (2015) find that Chinese banks with 
foreign investor ownership engage in income smoothing compared to banks without foreign investor 
ownership. Also, Curcio et al (2014) find that Chinese banks smooth income during the financial crisis. 
However, Bryce et al. (2015) find that Vietnamese banks did not engage in income smoothing. The 
results are mixed among Asian studies, and these studies did not consider the role of socio-political 
factors in influencing bank income smoothing. Studies like Wu et al (2015) show support for income 
smoothing, in contrast, this study document evidence for income smoothing targeted only at positive 
earnings. This also suggest that the Asian banking environment is different from the African banking 
environment. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
I examine bank income smoothing in Africa - focusing on the role of corruption in influencing income 
smoothing. I examine 302 African banks from 2004 to 2013 and find evidence of cross-country 
variation in income smoothing practices in Africa. I also find that income smoothing is reduced among 
African banks in strong investor protection environments while the smoothing of positive earnings is 
greater among banks in more corrupt environments. 
The main message of this paper is that corruption is significant and positively associated with income 
smoothing among African banks, and that strong investor protection reduces the extent of income 
smoothing particularly the smoothing of positive (and substantial) earnings. 
One implication of the findings is that loan loss provisions is probably not the target tool used by bank 
managers to smooth the entire earnings distribution as bank managers may prefer to use specific 
financial/accounting numbers to smooth the entire profit distribution or to smooth specific profit size. 
Secondly, regulators should not rely solely on loan loss provisions and reported earnings when assessing 
the credit risk exposure of African banks due to banks’ ability to hide risks by smoothing income, rather 
bank regulators should consider a number of other factors including institutional factors and other 
relevant issues in the socio-political environment. Thirdly, strong institutions can help reduce the 
opacity of bank’s financial reporting - policy makers should develop policies that strengthen existing 
institutions with the appropriate enforcement powers to monitor the financial reporting quality of 
African banks. Finally, the findings could prove to be valuable to investors in African banks since they 
must take into consideration the quality of country legal framework and institutions before making 
investment decisions. Investors should demand supplementary information and legal protection in order 
to reach a better investment decision and outcomes.  
One direction for future research is to investigate alternative accounting number(s) that African banks 
might use to smooth the entire earnings distribution. Future research could also investigate whether 
European, U.S or Asian banks preferably use provisions to smooth positive earnings.  
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Appendix 
 
A1: Means of Country Variables 
A1 report the means for the country variables for 19 countries. Data cover the period 2004 to 2013. 
Country Mean 
ΔGDP 
Mean 
CORRUPT 
Mean 
VA 
Mean 
COC 
Mean  
INVTPRO 
Mean 
EDL 
Mean 
LEGAL 
# 
Banks 
Algeria 3.1 100.22 -0.94 -0.52 5 6 -0.71 16 
Angola 10.8 154 -1.16 -1.32 5.3 6 -1.34 14 
Botswana 7.6 34 0.49 0.96 5.4 6 0.63 12 
Cameroun 3.5 137 -1.04 -0.99 4.3 1 -1.12 11 
Egypt 4.6 97.33 -1.05 -0.59 3.6 3 -0.12 16 
Ethiopia 11.0 121.56 -1.25 -0.69 3.3 4 -0.72 12 
Ghana 7.5 66.56 0.39 -0.04 6.3 5 -0.07 15 
Kenya 5.3 145 -0.24 -0.94 5 2 -0.96 24 
Mauritius 3.9 45.22 0.84 0.52 7.7 8 0.91 15 
Morocco 4.4 80.89 -0.71 -0.27 3.4 2 -0.18 18 
Namibia 5.3 55.67 0.39 0.25 5.3 5 0.15 10 
Nigeria 8.8 139.11 -0.77 -1.06 5.7 7 -1.22 16 
Senegal 3.8 88.78 -0.13 -0.43 3 1 -0.25 10 
South Africa 3.3 53 0.60 0.26 8 8 0.10 29 
Tanzania 6.7 101.22 -0.22 -0.46 4.9 3.9 -0.41 16 
Togo 3.5 130 -1.09 -0.96 3.7 1 -0.94 7 
Tunisia 3.9 59 -0.91 -0.08 4.8 5.8 0.13 26 
Uganda 7.1 119.33 -0.51 -0.83 4.7 5 -0.45 21 
Zambia 7.8 103.56 -0.25 -0.61 5.3 6 -0.51 14 
Note: CORRUPT = one divided by the mean of the perceived corruption index. 
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A2: Correlation of Country Variables 
Table 4 report the correlation matrix. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. P-values are reported in parenthesis 
        
        Variables ΔGDP EDL INVTPRO CORRUPT COC VA LEGAL 
ΔGDP 1000       
        
        
EDL -0.002 1.000      
 (0.908)       
        
INVTPRO -0.140*** 0.798*** 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.000)      
        
CORRUPT -0.145*** 0.429*** 0.427*** 1.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
        
COC -0.169*** 0.406*** 0.440*** 0.937*** 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
        
VA -0.126*** 0.396*** 0.705*** 0.609*** 0.683*** 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
        
LEGAL -0.196*** 0.347*** 0.327*** 0.876*** 0.913*** 0.587*** 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ----- 
        
        
 
